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Time and Qualitative Time

JOHN E. SMITH

In a previous study (“Time, Times and the ‘Right Time’”), I explored the distinction between these two aspects of time and their relations to each other. I wish to return to this topic, building on my previous discussion but bringing in some new dimensions that were unknown to me earlier on. I did not know, for example, that *kairos*, although it has metaphysical, historical, ethical, and esthetic applications, is a concept whose original home, so to speak, was in the ancient rhetorical traditions. A recent study (Kinnneavy, “Kairos: A Neglected Concept”) is aimed at recovering this important idea in the present situation. It is not insignificant that, while *kairos* has important philosophical implications, students of rhetoric have not been alone in neglecting it, as can be seen from the fact that it is not listed in the four volume *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* (ed. Philip Wiener), nor is it to be found in *The Great Ideas: A Synopticon* (ed. Mortimer Adler). One reason for the omission is no doubt the absence of any cognate word in English for *kairos*, whereas its partner, *chronos*, appears in a host of forms throughout any English dictionary. The only exception that occurs to me is the quite rare word “kairotic,” which is listed only in the most complete dictionaries. The loss of the concept of *kairos* is doubly unfortunate for, on the one hand, the idea has been of enormous significance in the past, figuring essentially, for instance, in the religious traditions of the West; and, on the other hand, it expresses a most important feature of temporal process which, despite exceptions here and there, is not expressed in the concept of *chronos*. It is with these facts in mind that I am attempting to rehabilitate, as it were, the *kairos* aspect of time and to show its philosophical importance.

It is best to begin with a basic statement intended to make clear the essential difference in meaning between *chronos* and *kairos*. Such a statement can be derived from what I presume is a well-known passage in the biblical book of *Ecclesiastes*; it runs as follows:
For everything there is a season, and a time for every purpose under heaven: a time
to be born and a time to die; a time to plant and a time to pluck up that which is
planted; a time to kill and a time to heal . . . a time to weep and a time to laugh . . .
(3:1 ff.)

Thanks to the translators of the Septuagint (the Greek version of the Old
Testament or Jewish Bible), we know that all the English expressions “a time
to” are translations of the term kairos, the right or opportune time to do
something often called “right timing.” This aspect of time is to be distin-
guished from chronos, which means the uniform time of the cosmic system,
the time which, in Newton’s phrase, aequabiliter fluit. In chronos we have the
fundamental conception of time as measure, the quantity of duration, the
length of periodicity, the age of an object or artifact, and the rate of accelera-
tion of bodies, whether on the surface of the earth or in the firmament be-
yond. The questions relevant to this aspect of time are: “How fast?” “How
frequent?” “How old?” and the answers to these questions can be given in car-
dinal numbers or, as it may be, in terms of limits that approach these num-
bers. By contrast, the term kairos points to a qualitative character of time, to
the special position an event or action occupies in a series, to a season when
something appropriately happens that cannot happen just at “any time,” but
only at that time, to a time that marks an opportunity which may not recur.
The question especially relevant to kairos is “When?” “At what time?” Hence,
kairos, or the “right time,” as the term is often translated, involves ordinality
or the conception of a special temporal position, such that what happens or
might happen at “that time” and its significance are wholly dependent on an
ordinal place in the sequences and intersections of events. It is for this reason,
as we shall see, that kairos is peculiarly relevant to the interpretation of histor-
ical events, because it points to their significance and purpose and to the idea
that there are constellations of events pregnant with a possibility (or possibil-
ities) not to be met with at other times and under different circumstances.

There is a second and coordinate meaning attached to kairos that is not
expressed in the illustration previously cited, although it is of equal impor-
tance. Kairos means also the “right measure” or proportion as expressed, in
the saying of Hesiod, “Observe due measure, and proportion (kairos) is best
in all things.” The same idea is found in the maxims attributed to the Greek
Sages, such as “Nothing in excess.” It is important to notice at this point that
the understanding of kairos within the scope of rhetoric primarily tended to-
ward an emphasis, if not overemphasis, on human action, since rhetoric is an
art or skill concerned with communication and persuasion. This emphasis,
however, must not be allowed to overshadow the ontological dimension of
kairos as manifest in various orders of happening, such as constellations of historical events, natural processes, and developments which have their own temporal frames and opportune times quite apart from human action, especially the action of this or that individual. Thus, for example, the vintner will be concerned with the “right time” to harvest the grapes, but, while not meaning to minimize the art and ingenuity of the vintner, the fact remains that this time will be largely a function of conditions—soil, temperature, moisture—ingredient in the growing process itself, to say nothing of the organic structure of the grapes and the time required for their maturation. In short kairos is not to be understood solely in the practical terms that are uppermost when the primary concern is rhetorical and the problem is to find the most appropriate discourse for the circumstances of time, place, the speaker, and the audience. It is interesting to note that, while the watchword of pre-Socratic ethics was “Know the opportunity” in the context of human action, the Pythagoreans regarded kairos as “one of the laws of the universe.” This cosmological dimension of kairos must not be lost, as indeed it could be if it were supposed that the chronos aspect of time is physical and metaphysical in import, while kairos is mainly anthropological or practical. This neat division will not do; both aspects of time are ingredient in the nature of things and both have practical import.

It is, of course, true that there will always be a subject-situation correlation where kairos is concerned, since someone will have to know or believe that he knows the right “when,” but this insight does not create that “when” out of itself. That time belongs to the ontological structure of the order of happening. Against this background, let us consider more closely the features of time denoted by chronos and kairos with special attention to the metaphysical and historical dimensions of reality and our experience of the world and ourselves. In addition, we must attempt to relate the two features to each other, so that we shall not find ourselves left with, so to speak, two times—a sort of two-timing—in separate compartments. To deal with this problem I shall suggest that kairos presupposes chronos, which is thus a necessary condition underlying qualitative times, but that, by itself, the chronos aspect does not suffice for understanding either specifically historical interpretations or those processes of nature and human experience where the chronos aspect reaches certain critical points at which a qualitative character begins to emerge, and when there are junctures of opportunity calling for human ingenuity in apprehending when the time is “right.”

As regards chronos, we find in Aristotle the classic expression of the concept of time as measure. In Physics (4.11.219b) he defined chronos as the “number of motion with respect to the before and the after,” with, of course, the understanding that “before” and “after” are not to be understood in a spatial sense.
This definition combines the three essential features of *chronos*—change, a unit of measure, and a serial order that is asymmetrical. There is, first, the element of change, motion, process, of something going on which lasts through or requires a stretch of time. Time, it appears, is not identical with the movement, but cannot be thought apart from the movement. Second, an appropriate unit of measure must be given, so that the elapsed time and the quantity of the movement can be measured or numbered. Third, there is the element of serial order or direction expressed in the terms “before” and “after.”

Time, so conceived, furnishes an essential grid upon which the processes of nature and of the historical order can be plotted and to that extent understood. Time as *chronos*, however, allows no features of events other than those previously indicated to be taken into account. Nevertheless these features enable us to establish a chronology both for what is sometimes called “natural history” or a reconstruction of geological, zoological, and so forth, ages or eras, and the history we associate with human development involving social, cultural, and political dimensions. This chronology is necessary in both cases, even if it is abstract in the sense that the concreteness of the content thus ordered is subordinated to the basic temporal organization. Still that remains indispensable, as can readily be seen in the case of evolutionary development and also in the case of human history where, despite the complexity and self-conscious character of the content, it is necessary to have a basic chronology, making possible the delineation of distinct persons, events and movements. In the evolutionary process, or perhaps we should say, in charting that development, it is essential that some basic dating pattern be established, such as was provided by the fossil record, astonishingly complete in some cases as, for example, the development of the horse known to us (*equus*) from its diminutive ancestor (* eohippus*) from the dim recesses of the past. There everything depended upon determining the true order of events, the kind of development that took place in each period and the length of time involved. In the case of human history, chronicles are the indispensable storehouse of material for the writing of history proper in providing for the dating of events and the identification of persons, governments, wars, religious movements, migrations, and indeed all the stuff of historical reality. Historical persons live and die, governments rise and fall, religious movements wax and wane, but in each case temporal boundaries must be determined which mark off the life or career of identifiable men and movements, climates of opinion and social customs. We may wonder how accurate it is to say that, for example, the medieval world came to an end abruptly and was thus discontinuous with the modern world that took its place. Was it simply a matter of moving from the nonscientific world of religious authority to the age of science and the mathematico-physical
explanations of ourselves and the world? These questions and others similar cannot be answered on the basis of the *chronos* aspect of time alone, but it is necessary to have some accepted chronology in which relevant historical constituents—thinkers, manuscripts, ecclesiastical pronouncements, scientific discoveries—can be dated. The discovery, for example, of the scientific work that was being done in the medical faculty of the University of Padua before the “end” of the Middle Ages has done much to force a change in our interpretation of the transition. Without precise dating of events and some conception of their temporal boundaries, such reinterpretation could not take place.

Although the *chronos* aspect of time is abstract in the sense of being universal, as compared with the here and now concreteness of *kairos*, the elements of *chronos* are essential to the subject matter and are not to be seen as defining a merely empty or external network. Process, the ubiquity of becoming, stretches over the entire physical and organic world. We are by now well aware that nothing happens at an instant. This fact directs attention to the functioning of things which, in turn, involves tendency and directionality. Qualities, objects, phases of a process, states of affairs are correlated with the length or measure of time required for them to take place, so that in a time less than the minimal necessary time the phenomenon in question does not occur. The flower now in the vase as something that has become—a determinate outcome—is a unified whole; in the process of its becoming, however, there was a time when it was not yet, which is to say that the time span chosen was less than the minimal time required. The serial order of before and after constitutes the continuity of becoming, which in turn leads to a definite outcome. It is highly significant that Georg Hegel and Alfred North Whitehead, different as their philosophies may be, are at one in seeing the need for a determinate result—Whitehead with the principle of limitation and Hegel with the idea that, unless something has become, we should have nothing more than sheer becoming.

The ingredience of the elements of *chronos* are even more perspicuous in the historical order. One of the legacies of the nineteenth century was the conception of history as a dynamic continuum of events marked by novelty and creativity, in contrast to the understanding of history in the previous century especially, as the succession of “ages,” which were largely static in themselves, like a series of tableaux in a museum. As regards the relevance of the length or measure of time both for historical development and for the interpreted record, illustrations abound and the point is almost too obvious to mention. It takes time to found a university, to establish a political party, to develop a religious tradition, to make a reputation. Those who, either through vanity or impatience, forget this fact will prove to be the victims of
history and not its makers. From the standpoint of assessment and interpretation, the lastingness of an institution, a movement, a pattern of thought will often be an important index of the value to be assigned to it in the historical record. And, conversely, the transience or evanescence of a phenomenon may be a signal of its insignificance. The date and duration of the persons, events and movements in history, together with the determination of their “before” and “after,” underlie all historical interpretation. Since the proper sequence of events is bound up with the problem of historical decision and causation, it is essential to determine what events were contemporaneous with each other, what events partially overlapped in an extended present, and what events were separated by an identifiable lapse of time. It is essential for determining and understanding “what really happened” to be able to ascertain whether, for example, an alleged assassin was or was not informed before the meeting of the convention where the intended victim would be seated on the platform. This feature of chronos is essential for historical knowledge, even if it is not sufficient.

Before turning to a closer examination of the elements included in the kairos aspect of time, it will be helpful to build at least one bridge between the two by going back to the example of the vintner noted earlier on. There is the sort of process which, even considered primarily from the standpoint of chronos, approaches the qualitative character expressed by kairos. The aging of wine—and I am sure that there are many similar processes of maturation—furnishes an excellent example of an organic process in which time takes on a qualitative character. According to the chemistry of wine making, virtually any wine, once it has been constituted, can be consumed while it is “young” but there is, for great wines, a time of maturity—this may involve decades—when the development reaches its peak. It is at this time that the wine will be at its best. There is a critical or “right time” for the vintage and prior to this critical point is “too soon” and after it has passed is “too late.” The quality possessed by the wine at its peak is obviously not unrelated to time in the sense of chronos, but it is not all that is involved, since the qualitative feature of the process itself must be taken into account, that is, what happens to the wine in that time and when is the critical time when a certain special quality has been reached. That is the “right time,” and it is of a piece with those situations that Hegel described in his concept of the “transition from quantity to quality,” where the temporal aspect of the development sets the critical time apart from “any time” or the utter indifference of the temporal units in measurement to the qualitative character of the outcome. A parallel point can be made in connection with history. As J. H. Randall has pointed out, history does not designate the mere occurrence of events in sequence but is concerned with their significance. “Our name,” he writes,
or the record of such occurrences is a “chronicle.” If the New York Times had been published from the first day of creation, we should have a most valuable “chronicle” of human history. But without further appraisal of what had been significant, we should have still no “history.” (31)

The important point is that the determination of that significance will involve recourse to all the kairoi or turning points in the historical order, the opportunities presented, the opportunities seized upon and the opportunities missed, the qualitative changes and transitions in the lives of individuals and nations and those constellations of events which made possible some outcome that could not have happened at any other time.

Turning now to the features of kairos time, it is important to note three distinct but related concepts. There is, first, the idea of the “right time” for something to happen in contrast to “any time,” a sense that is captured nicely in the word “timing,” as when we say, “The Governor’s timing was poor; he released the story to the press too soon and thus lost the advantage of surprising his political opponents.” Second, kairos means a time of tension and conflict, a time of crisis implying that the course of events poses a problem that calls for a decision at that time, which is to say that no generalized solution or response supposedly valid at any or every time will suffice. Third, kairos means that the problem or crisis has brought with it a time of opportunity (kairos is translated by the Latin opportunitas) for accomplishing some purpose which could not be carried out at some other time. Implicit in all three meanings embraced by kairos is the concept of an individual time having a critical ordinal position set apart from its predecessors and successors.

Earlier on it was said that the natural habitat of the concept of kairos was originally in the traditions of classical rhetoric; the best example of its use there can be seen in Plato’s Phaedrus following Socrates’s account of an ideal rhetoric. Since the passage contains most of the ingredients of kairos, I shall present it in full, but with the proviso that the main emphasis falls on human action and skill in the practice of an art. In short, the emphasis is more practical than metaphysical, but, nevertheless, the essential notions are there and they can be applied to other dimensions of reality.

Since it is in fact the function of speech to influence souls, a man who is going to be a speaker must know how many kinds of souls there are. Let us, then, state that they are of this or that sort, so that individuals also will be of this or that type. Again, the distinctions that apply here apply as well in the cases of speeches: they are of this or that number in type, and each type of one particular sort. So men of a special sort under the influence of speeches of a particular kind are readily persuaded to take action of a definite sort because of the qualitative correlation that obtains between speech and soul; while men of a different sort are hard to persuade because, in their case, this qualitative correlation does not obtain. Very well. When a student has at-
tained an adequate grasp of these facts intellectually, he must next go on to see with his own eyes that they occur in the world of affairs and are operative in practice; he must acquire the capacity to confirm their existence through the sharp use of his senses. If he does not do this, no part of the theoretical knowledge he acquired as a student is as yet of any help to him. But it is only when he has the capacity to declare to himself with complete perception, in the presence of another, that here is the man and here the nature that was discussed theoretically at school—here, now present to him in actuality—to which he must apply this kind of speech in this sort of manner in order to obtain persuasion for this kind of activity—it is when he can do all this and when he has, in addition, grasped the concept of propriety of time [kairos]—when to speak and when to hold his tongue [eukairos and akairos], when to use brachylogy, piteous language, hyperbole for horrific effect, and, in a word, each of the specific devices of discourse he may have studied—it is only then, and not until then, that the finishing and perfecting touches have been given to his science. (Phaedrus, 271–72b)

The passage, I believe, speaks for itself, but there are two points deserving of special notice. First, there is the confrontation in actuality; the speaker must speak to that other person and no other, and he is to apply this sort of manner in order to succeed in persuasion for this kind of activity. There is an undeniable particularity about the situation, which requires that the person identify in fact and at the time the sort of man he had studied theoretically at school. Second, the entire situation is encompassed by kairos—here translated as “propriety of time”—which means knowing when to speak, when to be silent, and when to use the specific devices of discourse contained in the science of rhetoric. One is reminded here of William James’s comment about the encyclopedia in the book case in his office. Here is all knowledge and truth, he said, but the question is when do I utter these truths? No one goes about uttering true propositions stretching from “Aardvark” to “Zygote”; on the contrary, we cite this information only when it is needed or relevant. It is this aspect of kairos that Paul Tillich emphasized in a number of writings aimed at recovering the basic idea. Consequently, he contrasted kairos with logos where the latter represents truth that is regarded as universal in import and the former the special occasion in the course of events when such truth must be brought to bear by an individual somewhere and somewhen.

There are two further illustrations of the concept of kairos in Plato’s writings. One is to be found in the Seventh Letter (324b) and the other in the fourth book of the Laws. The first of these might be regarded as an application of the theory of rhetoric set forth in Phaedrus, while the second is specifically ontological in import. In the Letter, Plato is responding to a request from the followers of Dion for his support. These followers claim a loyalty to Dion’s principles and argue that on that account Plato should lend his support. He then proposes to tell what Dion’s policy was and how it originated. The narrative might indeed be told at any time, but Plato regards his telling
of it at that particular time—“the present moment”—as a seizing of a time which is “opportune.” This moment is “right” because it serves the special purpose of laying down a criterion in terms of which Plato will make his own decision and, at the same time, provide Dion’s successors with a touchstone for assessing their own views.

In the fourth book of the *Laws* (709b ff.), Plato discusses the different factors that govern human life in connection with the question whether laws are explicitly and designedly made by man or whether external factors are involved. He declares, “Chance [τυχή] and occasion [καιρός] cooperate with God in the control of all human affairs.” These two mundane factors are said to condition human action and also to be in harmony with each other. Whatever may be the source of that harmony, it is noteworthy that Plato is here contrasting the time expressed by *kairos* with the notion of chance. What happens by “chance” is said to be opaque to human understanding; chance is a coming together of events that, for all we can understand or determine, could have happened at “any time.” Occasion, on the contrary, points to a right or favorable time which makes possible what, under different circumstances, could not come to pass. Occasions are times which must be apprehended as such through historical insight; they are, moreover, times for historical decision and action. What comes by “chance” takes place without our having any sense that the events “conspired” to bring about the result. We often express our failure to grasp any pattern in the chance occurrence by saying that the event “just happened to take place that way.” The important point here is that the time of *kairos* is seen as an ontological element in the basic structure of things and, while that time calls for a human response, the occasion itself is not of human devising. I stress the point in order to counteract the idea that, as might appear from the context of rhetoric, *kairos* represents no more than a human standpoint. That interpretation is ruled out because of the clearly metaphysical context of the statements in question.

The concept of *kairos*, as I indicated at the outset, not only has had a prominent place in philosophical thinking across the centuries, a fact to be explained in part by the neglect of the idea itself, but also by the tendency among those thinkers who were concerned for the philosophy of history to place a basic emphasis on the *chronos* features of time and to model their thinking after the patterns of natural process. The ancient paradigm of this way of thinking is found in the *History* of Thucydides, where he claims that his work is a creation “forever”: because of the cyclical image of time presupposed throughout the book; the events will recur. This image was clearly drawn from the repetitions and recurrences of natural processes, the procession of the seasons, the phases of the moon, and other cycles in nature. It is important to notice, however, that the idea of history fundamental to the
Western religious traditions run exactly counter to these cyclical views. For both Judaism and Christianity, history has a decidedly linear character, a scene of dramatic unfolding of events, a medium for the disclosure of the Divine. Time is neither a circle ever returning to itself, nor primarily an order of perishing, but a dynamic continuum of events punctuated by turning points and crises that concern the destinies of men and nations. In this sense, history was regarded as having a being of its own to be grasped and interpreted in terms appropriate to itself and not after the image of nature. Paul Tillich was the one thinker in this century to attempt the recovery of the idea of *kairos* which, for him, is the foundation of historical consciousness aware of itself. “Time,” he writes,

is an empty form only for abstract, objective reflection, a form that can receive any kind of content; but to him who is conscious of an ongoing creative life it is laden with tensions, with possibilities and impossibilities. Not everything is possible at every time, not everything is true at every time, nor is everything demanded at every moment. . . . In this tremendous, most profoundly stirred consciousness of history is rooted the idea of the *kairos*. (33)

Here the time of *kairos* is seen as a summons to the attainment of historical consciousness as such, for, as Tillich points out, outlooks unaware of history have been more the rule than the exception and they have had deep roots of a metaphysical kind. If the primary focus of attention is on what is beyond time—the eternal—there can be no change and no history. Conversely, if all time is bound up with the world of nature and the eternally recurrent, history is once again lost, having been engulfed by something other than itself. Tillich’s proposal is that a new awareness of the time of crisis and opportunity is the key to the recovery of history as the meaningful development of what matters most in human life. The underlying religious meaning of *kairos* is found, for the Judaic tradition, in the critical times of religious history, when the mundane temporal order intersected with the sacred order in the form of a disclosure of the divine will. From Moses to the last of the great prophetic figures there was a series of “presents” or special times when the voice of the sacred stood in judgment on secular affairs. These times were opportunities for transformation and reformation, a return from waywardness to truth and righteousness. In Christianity, *kairos* was focused on the central event of Christ, who is said in the biblical writings to have come *en kairo*, sometimes translated as “the fullness of time”—implying a culmination in a temporal development marked by the manifestation of God in an actual historical order. Tillich proposed to generalize this concept to apply to the interpretation of history, in which the dynamic is found in those individuals and movements that seek to identify the opportunity in some crucial juncture of
history and to seize it in the form of transformatory action undertaken in the name of an ideal. That this basic idea has applications beyond the dimension of the religious in the proper sense can be seen in Hegel’s epoch of perfect self-consciousness, Karl Marx’s idea of the classless society, and Auguste Comte’s final stage of science or the positive philosophy. Tillich calls these *kairoi* in the absolute sense, since they serve as the ideal or objective goal that is to determine the purposeful response to all the occasions upon which an opportunity to foster the ideal is presented or perceived as existing in some present constellation of events. *Kairos* is thus ingredient not only in the interpretation of history but in, we may say, “history in the making” as well. According to the doctrine of *kairos*, there is no logical, physical, or economic necessity in the historical process, because it is seen as moving through a unity of freedom and fate which distinguishes history from the natural order.

The reach and relevance of the *kairos* features of time can be seen in the many dimensions of experience. The presence of these features in the rhetorical, historical, religious, and ontological orders has already been noted; there are others as well. In the ethical domain *kairos* appears as *justice* or the proper measure according to merit or what is “due” to an individual in an order of equality. In the order of knowing, *kairos* signals the need to bring universal ideas and principles to bear in historical time and situations and, thus, calls for decisions about values, means, and ends that cannot be a matter of law alone but require wisdom and critical judgment. In the domain of art, *kairos* is the right measure or proportion directed by the aim of creating a unified, individual work expressive of esthetic value. And this is not all. *Kairos* manifests itself in the therapeutic crises of Freudian psychology and the determination of the “right time” for certain disclosures and confrontations of patients with themselves; in education, where some sense of timing is required in estimating the progress and maturity of the individual student, how much he or she can profitably deal with at a given stage of development, and, most recently, in current literary theory, where the “near autonomy” of the text is being challenged by insisting on the individuality of the reader’s response in interpretation.

The last instance presents an occasion—a *kairos*—for closing with some critical remarks concerning the limitations and liabilities involved in the conception of *kairos*. Too much attention to the singularity of the temporal occasion can have the effect of obscuring enduring principles and truths. Some classical scholars, for instance, have suggested that Plato’s emphasis on the timelessness of the forms was an attempt to counteract the incipient relativism of the rhetorician bent on nothing more than the adaptation of discourse to the particular circumstances of time, place, speaker, and audience. Something of this problem is posed by so-called situational ethics, where the
particularity of the situation overcomes the generality of principle, so that the gap between the two becomes unbridgeable. Much as I admire the thought of William James, I cannot overlook his near obsession with the problem of what general features a philosophical position must embody in order to get itself believed. There are times when it appears that the question whether a given view is true or defensible is entirely overshadowed by the concern that it be presented in a way that will awaken an interest and enlist the allegiance of the listener. Despite these and other dangers surrounding the engaged response to the particular time and circumstance at hand, the important features of life and experience comprehended by the notion of *kairos* far outweigh the disadvantages; without the reality of qualitative times, life would be dull and drab indeed. We would be left with the tyranny known to us all—that of merely being on time.

Notes

1. I shall not enter into a discussion of the possible circularity in the definition. Suffice it to say that the terms he used—*hysteron* and *proteron*—were generally regarded as *temporal* in connotation.

2. The length of time and the nature of the development that took place are essentially related. For example, an important juncture in the evolutionary pattern of the horse was the transition from *browsing* to *grazing*. Since the bulk of fossil remains is in the form of teeth, the fact that the silicon content of the grasses is far higher than that of shrubs and small trees meant that in grazing teeth would be ground down in a shorter time than in the browsing stage. It was thus possible to date the time of transition.

Works Cited


