Ph.D. University of Michigan
His current research addresses equally the nature of judgment and belief and the nature of intention. This work extends a longstanding project on the role of trust in epistemic and practical rationality.
Teaches courses in epistemology, moral psychology, and the metaphysics of action and mind.
"Assurance and Warrant," Philosophers' Imprint 14:17 (June 2014).
"Narrative and the Stability of Intention," forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy.
"Assertion, Sincerity, and Knowledge," Noûs 47:4 (December 2013).
"Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia," Philosophical Studies 166:3 (December 2013).
"Reflection, Disagreement, and Context," American Philosophical Quarterly 49:2 (April 2012).
"Conspiracy, Commitment, and the Self," Ethics 120:3 (April 2010).
"Receptivity and the Will," Noûs 43:3 (September 2009).
"Advising as Inviting to Trust," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35:3 (September 2005).
"Telling as Inviting to Trust," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70:3 (May 2005).
"Trust and Diachronic Agency," Noûs 37:1 (March 2003).
"How Might Trust Generate Second-Personal Reasons?,” in Paul Faulkner and Tom Simpson (eds.), New Philosophical Perspectives on Trust (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Material from this paper will provide the basis for talks at Oxford (September 2014) and Northwestern (April 2015).
"'What on Earth Was I Thinking?' How Anticipating Plan's End Places an Intention in Time", in Roman Altshuler and Michael Sigrist (eds), Time and the Philosophy of Action, (Routledge, forthcoming).
"Can Trust Itself Ground a Reason to Believe the Trusted?," in Abstracta, Special Issue VI (December 2012): A Symposium on Paul Faulkner's Knowledge on Trust.
"Review of Benjamin McMyler's Testimony, Trust, and Authority," in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (March 2012).